When Drug Pricing Becomes Trade Policy


For years, pharmaceutical companies could treat U.S. reimbursement, European market access, trade policy and manufacturing strategy as related but mostly separate issues. That separation is becoming harder to defend.

The Administration has linked U.S. drug prices to prices paid abroad, pursued voluntary most favored nation agreements, proposed international benchmarks in Medicare, and tied pharmaceutical tariff treatment to both pricing and domestic manufacturing commitments. The important change is not simply that the United States wants lower drug prices.

Foreign reimbursement systems and manufacturing choices are now being pulled into U.S. trade policy. The Supreme Court held in February 2026 that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.

The Administration responded by preserving and expanding other statutory tools. Section 232 is being used against patented pharmaceutical imports and Section 301 is being used to examine foreign pharmaceutical pricing practices.

FDA is also using the Commissioner’s National Priority Voucher (CNPV) program to connect regulatory timing with priorities that include domestic manufacturing and supply chain resilience.

The United Kingdom shows the negotiated path. Germany shows the enforcement path.1-6,13

C SUITE TAKEAWAY

Management should ask more than “What does this reimbursement rule require?” The better question is “How does this pricing, launch, manufacturing or market access decision change our exposure under U.S. payment policy and trade law?”

Seven developments define the current landscape

  1. Most Favored Nation (MFN) pricing has moved from policy idea to announced company agreements. The White House says it has announced 17 agreements with major pharmaceutical manufacturers designed to bring U.S. prices closer to those paid in other developed countries.7
  2. GLOBE and GUARD are still proposed CMS models. They are not final rules. They matter because they show how international prices could become inputs into Medicare Part B and Part D payment policy.8,9
  3. The proposed GLOBE and GUARD rules would exclude a drug while a Medicare Maximum Fair Price is in effect. That reduces the direct IRA versus MFN conflict earlier versions of this paper anticipated.8,9
  4. In February 2026, the Supreme Court held that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The same day, the White House expressly stated that the rollback did not affect duties imposed under Sections 232 or 301.1,2
  5. The post decision response was immediate. USTR announced accelerated Section 301 investigations, specifically identifying pharmaceutical pricing practices as an area of concern, while the Administration maintained Section 232 tariffs and investigations.3
  6. On April 2, 2026, the President imposed Section 232 tariffs on patented pharmaceuticals and associated ingredients, with tariff treatment linked to trade deals, onshoring plans and MFN pricing agreements. In June, USTR opened a Section 301 investigation into Germany’s alleged underpayment for innovative medicines. Together, those actions show a coordinated two statute strategy directed at both supply chains and foreign pricing systems.4,5
  7. FDA is also adding regulatory speed to the manufacturing equation. The CNPV program can accelerate review for selected products that advance priorities including domestic manufacturing and supply chain resilience or affordability. FDA describes a target review timeline of one to two months and lists multiple approvals under the program in 2026.13

Drug Pricing is Becoming an Enterprise Risk

The old line between reimbursement policy and corporate strategy is fading. The change is easy to describe. A pricing concession in one country can affect an international benchmark.

A launch delay can change which country becomes a reference point. A manufacturing location can change tariff exposure or government leverage.

A market access decision that once looked local can now affect U.S. revenue assumptions. Consider a simple example in which a manufacturer launches a drug in Europe at a lower negotiated price.

That price could later become relevant to a U.S. international benchmark. The same company may manufacture the drug outside the United States, creating a separate tariff question.

Two decisions made by different teams can now affect the economics of the same product. This does not mean every European price automatically becomes a U.S. price or every foreign reimbursement decision becomes a trade violation. The rules differ by program, product and country.

Some U.S. models remain proposed, and the Germany investigation has not produced a final finding. The direction is nevertheless clear: U.S. policymakers are using international price comparisons, company agreements, and trade authorities to influence pharmaceutical economics at home and abroad.

Therefore, management cannot leave drug pricing only to market access, trade only to customs counsel, manufacturing only to operations, or government affairs only to monitoring. Senior leaders need one view of how a decision in one part of the company can move value or risk somewhere else.

MANAGEMENT IMPLICATION

The strategic advantage is understanding what a price or manufacturing decision in one market can do to the rest of the company.

What Changed After the Supreme Court?

The Supreme Court narrowed one tariff pathway. The Administration then turned more heavily to laws that specifically authorize trade action. [Primary source anchors: Supreme Court,1 White House,2 USTR.3]

On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court held in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, together with Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The Court’s ruling matters because it rejected the use of a broad emergency economic statute as tariff authority.

It did not hold that the President lacks all tariff authority. Congress has separately delegated trade powers through other statutes.1

The Administration made its response explicit. On the day of the decision, the White House ended the IEEPA tariff actions at issue while stating that duties imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act and Section 301 of the Trade Act were not affected.

USTR separately announced that it would initiate several accelerated Section 301 investigations and specifically identified pharmaceutical pricing practices as a target area.2,3

Section 122 served as a temporary bridge through a 150-day import surcharge tied to balance of payments concerns, but pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical ingredients were exempt. The more durable pharmaceutical story is the Administration’s move toward Sections 232 and 301.2

What Do Sections 232 and 301 Actually Do?

Section 232 focuses on the product: where it comes from and whether imports threaten national security. On April 2, 2026, the President used it to impose a 100% baseline tariff on covered patented pharmaceuticals and associated ingredients, with different rates for trade deal countries and preferential treatment for companies with approved U.S. manufacturing plans or MFN pricing agreements.

The proclamation links tariff treatment, MFN pricing and domestic manufacturing. Section 301 focuses on the foreign government: whether its acts, policies or practices may be unreasonable, discriminatory or burdensome to U.S. commerce.

On June 18, USTR used that authority to open the Germany pharmaceutical pricing investigation.4,5 The legal novelty is not that Sections 232 and 301 are new statutes.

Both have long histories and established procedures. What has not yet been squarely tested by the Supreme Court is this coordinated post Learning Resources use of statute specific trade authorities to recreate leverage that had previously been asserted through IEEPA, especially when pharmaceutical pricing, reimbursement, market access, and onshoring are treated as parts of one trade strategy.

That does not mean the architecture is unlawful. It means companies should treat litigation risk and statutory fit as part of the strategic analysis rather than assume the new scheme has already received judicial approval.

THE LEGAL POINT

The post IEEPA strategy is not simply “more tariffs.” Section 232 pressures products, manufacturing, and supply chains through a national security theory. Section 301 pressures foreign government practices through an unfair trade theory. Used together, they create leverage on both the company and the country. The statutes are established. Their coordinated pharmaceutical use in this form is still developing.

Regulatory Speed Adds Another Dimension to U.S. Manufacturing Decisions

Trade policy is not the only way the federal government is influencing pharmaceutical manufacturing decisions. FDA is also using regulatory incentives that may change how management evaluates the economics of producing medicines in the United States.13

The CNPV program is designed to accelerate review of selected drugs and biologics that advance defined U.S. health priorities. Those priorities include domestic manufacturing and supply chain resilience, affordability, unmet medical need and important medical innovation.

FDA describes a target review timeline of one to two months for selected applications, compared with six months or more under other priority review programs.13 For management teams, the important point is the value of time.

A U.S. manufacturing decision has traditionally been evaluated against construction costs, labor, taxes, supply chain reliability, and access to the U.S. market. Regulatory timing can now become another part of that calculation.

A company considering U.S. manufacturing should therefore ask whether the location of manufacturing could affect more than tariff exposure and supply chain risk. If a product can qualify for CNPV review, faster regulatory timing may also affect launch planning, revenue timing and the value of the asset. FDA lists multiple approvals under the program in 2026.13

A company should not move manufacturing simply to pursue a voucher. CNPV eligibility depends on the product and the program criteria, and manufacturing investments remain long term decisions. The program does give CEOs and boards another variable to consider when comparing U.S. manufacturing with alternatives elsewhere.

THE MANAGEMENT IMPLICATION

For companies already evaluating U.S. manufacturing capacity, regulatory timing belongs in the same discussion as construction costs, labor, taxes, tariff treatment and supply chain resilience. CNPV does not change the need for a sound manufacturing business case. It gives management another factor to consider when comparing U.S. manufacturing with alternatives elsewhere.13

How MFN Is Being Put into Practice

There is not a single MFN program, as the Administration is using several different approaches that connect prices paid abroad with U.S. pricing policy. The current MFN approach began with Executive Orders in April and May 2025 directing federal agencies to lower prescription drug prices and pursue prices for Americans that more closely reflect prices available in comparable developed countries.10

Since then, the White House says it has announced 17 MFN agreements with major pharmaceutical manufacturers. Those agreements, TrumpRx and related pricing initiatives show that the Administration is using several tools at once: negotiation, public pressure, federal payment policy, market access programs and trade leverage.7,11

GLOBE: Proposed international benchmarking for Part B

GLOBE is a proposed mandatory CMS Innovation Center model for certain Medicare Part B drugs. As proposed, manufacturers would owe rebates when U.S. prices exceed an international benchmark.

CMS currently anticipates an October 1, 2026, start, subject to a final rule.8 One point is especially important. GLOBE would not simply stack a lower international price on top of an IRA negotiated price.

The proposal would exclude a Part B drug while an IRA Maximum Fair Price, or MFP, is in effect. The challenge is therefore managing different pricing systems at different points in a product’s life, not choosing the lower of two federal prices.8

GUARD: Proposed international benchmarking for Part D

GUARD is a proposed mandatory CMS Innovation Center model for certain Medicare Part D drugs. If finalized, CMS anticipates a January 1, 2027, start. Like GLOBE, GUARD would use rebates tied to prices paid in economically comparable countries.9

GUARD would also exclude a drug while an MFP is in effect. International pricing can still affect U.S. economics before or after that period, so management needs to know which program applies when and how an earlier pricing decision may affect the product later.9

GENEROUS: Medicaid and international net prices

GENEROUS works differently—it is a voluntary Medicaid model launched in January 2026. Participating manufacturers provide supplemental rebates intended to align Medicaid net prices with what selected other countries pay, while participating states use standardized coverage rules.12

For executives, the acronym is not the important part. The larger point is that international price comparisons are becoming more common inside U.S. healthcare policy while trade policy is simultaneously being used to pressure foreign pricing and manufacturing behavior. Payment and trade are now moving on parallel tracks.

WHAT NOT TO DO

Do not treat GLOBE, GUARD, and GENEROUS as one unified “MFN rule.” They work differently, apply to different populations and are at different stages. The C-suite needs a product-by-product map, not one slogan.

The United Kingdom: Pricing as the Price of Trade Accommodation

The UK shows how reimbursement policy and tariff policy can be negotiated together [Primary source anchor: UK Government].6

The U.S. and UK pharmaceutical arrangement is one of the clearest examples of reimbursement, MFN policy and trade law being negotiated together. Under the arrangement published April 2, 2026, the UK committed to increase the net NHS price paid for prospective new medicines by 25% beginning in April 2026, increase spending on new medicines over time, modify NICE access economics and cap specified VPAG repayment rates.6

In return, the United States committed to protect qualifying UK pharmaceutical products from Section 232 tariffs through January 19, 2029, provided specified company MFN and tariff agreement conditions are met, and to refrain from additional Section 301 pharmaceutical tariffs during the stated period. The arrangement also expressly references GENEROUS and anticipated GLOBE and GUARD protections intended to reduce launch disincentives in a lower priced market.6

The significance is straightforward. The arrangement does not treat drug prices, patient access, supply chain resilience, MFN, Section 232 and Section 301 as separate policy files. It puts them in the same bargain. That is the architecture this analysis is describing.

What a CEO should see in the UK example

  • A country’s reimbursement system can become part of a broader economic negotiation.
  • Tariff protection can depend on company behavior and government pricing commitments.
  • Governments are now paying attention to launch incentives because a low launch price can affect international reference models.
  • A country’s expected revenue is only one factor in a market access decision.

THE DEEPER LESSON

The UK arrangement is the negotiated version of the new framework: price and access commitments on one side, tariff and launch protections on the other. For global manufacturers, market access and trade strategy need to be managed together.

Germany: Section 301 Turns Reimbursement into Trade Enforcement

Germany shows how the same policy shift can reach a foreign reimbursement system. [Primary source anchor: USTR].5

On June 18, 2026, USTR opened a Section 301 investigation into Germany’s alleged “persistent underpayment” for innovative pharmaceutical products. In simple terms, USTR is asking whether German pricing and reimbursement practices are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.

Those are allegations being investigated, not final legal findings.5 The investigation is still underway.

Written comments were due August 10, 2026, and USTR has scheduled a public hearing for September 22, 2026. The process can end without tariffs, through findings and responsive action, or through a negotiated resolution.5

The larger point goes beyond Germany. Section 232 can pressure where and how pharmaceutical companies manufacture. S

ection 301 can pressure how foreign governments pay for medicines. Germany therefore supplies the second half of the coordinated strategy that the April Section 232 proclamation began to make concrete.4,5

A CAUTION FOR MANAGEMENT

Do not assume the Germany investigation means tariffs are inevitable. Section 301 is a process. Management should assume, however, that foreign pharmaceutical pricing policy can now lead to U.S. trade scrutiny, political pressure, and, potentially, responsive action.

Five Questions the C Suite Should Ask Now

The objective is to turn policy complexity into decision discipline.

  1. Where should we launch, and in what order? Launch sequencing now affects more than time to revenue. Management should ask whether a launch price in one market could influence an international benchmark, affect another government negotiation or change the economics of entering a lower priced market.
  2. Which international prices create U.S. exposure? The company should know which products, countries and net price arrangements could matter under GLOBE, GUARD, GENEROUS, voluntary MFN commitments or future federal models. Where a policy looks to net pricing, the analysis should include confidential rebates and not just public list prices.
  3. What happens if another country “becomes Germany?” Every major market access strategy should be tested for two questions: what does this mean locally, and could U.S. policymakers view the system as unfair to U.S. commerce?
  4. How does manufacturing location change our options? Section 232 makes manufacturing location, country of origin and domestic manufacturing commitments relevant to tariff treatment. CNPV adds a separate regulatory consideration because domestic manufacturing and supply chain resilience are among the priorities that can support accelerated review for selected products. Section 301 remains relevant where a foreign government’s reimbursement system becomes a trade issue. Management should model what the company controls, what regulatory incentives may be available and what a government partner may be pressured to change.13
  5. Who inside the company makes sure these decisions connect? If legal, market access, finance, government affairs, trade and supply chain teams optimize separately, the company may create global exposure while making a locally rational decision. Senior management needs a process that forces those perspectives into the same room before a material commitment is made.

How Management Can Put the Pieces Together

The goal is simple: give management one way to see how pricing, trade, manufacturing and market access decisions connect. Management does not need to predict every final rule.

It needs a repeatable way to test major decisions against a changing set of legal and commercial risks. We recommend building one cross border pricing and trade exposure map around the company’s major products and pipeline assets.

The transaction and investment lens

This same framework should be used in acquisitions, licensing deals and major capital projects. A product’s pricing history, European launch sequence, manufacturing footprint and government commitments can affect future value even when they do not stand out in a traditional healthcare regulatory review. Investors and boards should ask whether those factors add value, limit flexibility or create a risk that has not been modeled.

What Management Teams Should Do in the Next 90 Days

The current environment favors preparation over prediction. Build one enterprise exposure map. Do not maintain separate U.S., UK, and EU trade analyses that never connect. Put the major products, markets, prices, rebates, launch dates and manufacturing locations on one decision map.

Revisit launch sequencing assumptions. Identify lower priced markets that could affect an international benchmark or a government negotiating position. Consider whether timing, sequencing, or a different contract structure changes the economics.

Stress test the UK and Germany scenarios. Ask what the company would do if a key market were offered a UK style accommodation, faced a Germany style Section 301 investigation, or saw its pharmaceutical exports subjected to Section 232 leverage.

Review the manufacturing footprint through a trade and regulatory lens. For each critical patented product and ingredient, identify country of origin, applicable Section 232 treatment, domestic manufacturing commitments, trade deal status, alternative sourcing and the financial cost of a tariff or policy change.

For products tied to current or planned U.S. manufacturing, assess whether CNPV eligibility or regulatory timing should be part of the investment analysis.13

Set a senior escalation rule. Major pricing, launch and manufacturing decisions should trigger a cross functional review before the company gives up flexibility that may be valuable in another market. Monitor the rules that can change the map.

GLOBE and GUARD remain proposed, the Germany Section 301 process is ongoing, and the pharmaceutical Section 232 regime contains country and company specific conditions. Management should plan around the current landscape while keeping enough flexibility to update assumptions as rules, agreements, enforcement actions, and litigation evolve.

BOARD LEVEL QUESTION

Can management explain, on one page, how a major pricing decision in Europe could change U.S. reimbursement, trade, manufacturing and valuation exposure? If not, the company probably does not yet have one enterprise view of the risk.

Conclusion

Drug pricing has entered a new phase. Foreign pharmaceutical prices are now part of more than a domestic affordability debate.

International prices appear in federal payment models and manufacturer agreements, while pharmaceutical pricing, manufacturing and market access have become subjects of bilateral trade negotiation and statutory trade enforcement.

The Supreme Court’s Learning Resources decision removed IEEPA as the tariff authority the Administration had been using. The policy response was not retreat.

The White House expressly preserved Sections 232 and 301, USTR announced new Section 301 investigations that included pharmaceutical pricing, the President imposed a pharmaceutical Section 232 regime in April, and USTR opened the Germany pharmaceutical pricing investigation in June.1-5

For CEOs, CFOs, general counsel and commercial leaders, the most important development may be the structure that emerges from those actions. Section 232 can link tariff treatment to manufacturing, domestic investment and MFN commitments.

Section 301 can convert a foreign reimbursement policy into a U.S. trade dispute. CNPV adds regulatory timing to the manufacturing decision by making domestic manufacturing and supply chain resilience relevant to accelerated review eligibility for selected products.

Together, these tools can affect company decisions, government policy and the economics of where a product is developed, manufactured and launched.13

The statutes themselves are not new, and this paper does not assume that a court would uphold or invalidate every future application. The unresolved issue is how far this coordinated use of Sections 232 and 301 can go when tested against the language, procedures and limits of Sections 232 and 301.

Companies should not wait for that litigation to be resolved before understanding their exposure. The better approach is to see the connections before the commercial decision is made. That is where policy foresight becomes business strategy.

About the Author

Ron Lanton, Senior Partner & Global Strategist at Lanton, Lanton & Sosa Law PLLC.

References

The following primary government sources support the principal legal and policy developments discussed in this paper. They are included so readers can independently verify the underlying events. All were current as of August 14, 2026.

  1. Supreme Court of the United States. Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump; Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. Opinion issued February 20, 2026. supremecourt.gov
  2. The White House. Ending Certain Tariff Actions; Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems. Published February 20, 2026. whitehouse.gov
  3. Office of the US Trade Representative. Ambassador Greer Issues Statement on Supreme Court IEEPA Decision. Published February 20, 2026. ustr.gov
  4. The White House. Adjusting Imports of Pharmaceuticals and Pharmaceutical Ingredients into the United States. Published April 2, 2026. whitehouse.gov
  5. Office of the US Trade Representative. USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301 Investigation of Germany’s Persistent Underpayment for Innovative Pharmaceutical Products. Published June 18, 2026. ustr.gov
  6. Government of the United Kingdom. Arrangement Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom on Pharmaceutical Pricing. Published April 2, 2026. gov.uk
  7. The White House. Fact Sheet: Expansion of TrumpRx.gov and 17 Most-Favored-Nation Drug Pricing Agreements. Published May 18, 2026. whitehouse.gov
  8. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. GLOBE Model. cms.gov. Accessed August 19, 2026.
  9. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. GUARD Model. cms.gov. Accessed August 19, 2026.
  10. The White House. Lowering Drug Prices by Once Again Putting Americans First. Published April 15, 2025. whitehouse.gov; The White House. Delivering Most-Favored-Nation Prescription Drug Pricing to American Patients. Published May 12, 2025. whitehouse.gov
  11. The White House. Savings from Most-Favored-Nation Drug Pricing Policy. Published May 5, 2026. whitehouse.gov
  12. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. GENEROUS Model. Updated July 1, 2026. cms.gov
  13. US Food and Drug Administration. Commissioner’s National Priority Voucher (CNPV) Pilot Program. Updated August 14, 2026. fda.gov

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Durkin: North American Trade Is Critical to U.S. Manufacturing


America’s relationship with Mexico and Canada is the most complementary and symbiotic set of trade relationships the United States has, NAM Vice President of International Policy Andrea Durkin said on Grant Thornton’s DC Dispatch podcast recently.

  • Durkin’s comments come as U.S. and Canadian trade leaders meet to resolve differences ahead of proposed U.S. tariffs on Canada scheduled to take effect on Aug. 19.

The case for USMCA: “We export one-third of all U.S. manufactured goods to Canada and Mexico,” Durkin told Grant Thornton’s David Sites and Colin Wilhelm. “That is more than to the next nine U.S. manufacturing export partners combined.”

  • “And since implementation of USMCA, 15 of 18 manufacturing sub-sectors have increased their exports to Canada and Mexico, and they’re growing faster than to other markets.”

A symbiotic relationship: Many companies straddle these borders and benefit hugely from drawing resources from—and selling goods to—all of North America. “Half of what we’re buying from Canada and nearly 70% of what we buy from Mexico is trade within a single corporate parent,” Durkin pointed out. “It is truly regionalized co-production.”

  • Durkin emphasized that America’s trade relationship with Mexico and Canada helps it compete with China, and that the administration must balance its desire to onshore as much production as possible with keeping that regional partnership strong.

The review process explained: As a key champion of the USMCA when it was originally passed, the NAM urged policymakers to renew and modernize the agreement during its scheduled review in July. The Trump administration decided not to pursue a 16-year renewal this year, but as Durkin told the podcast hosts, that was no catastrophe.

  • The agreement will stay in force for another decade, and the three countries will continue to conduct annual reviews (CNBC).

Priorities for cooperation: Durkin laid out a few priorities for policymakers as they consider the ongoing maintenance of the agreement.

  • Strengthen implementation and coordination: “With the volume of trade and breadth of this agreement, there will always be implementation issues on any given day,” she said, noting the three countries should continually look for ways to improve coordination, make trade at the border more fluid and manage risks more effectively. “That can always be improved and should be regularly discussed.”
  • Build on the agreement: The countries should pursue additional cooperation on customs facilitation, energy, AI policy or critical minerals policy, without necessarily reopening the USMCA itself, Durkin continued. 
  • Address changes carefully: They should also continue discussions on consequential issues that could affect how companies use the agreement, including potential changes to rules of origin. 

The geopolitical angle: Durkin also highlighted the administration’s push to compete with China.

  • Emphasizing that competition with China will continue to drive U.S. investment in the “technological race in advanced manufacturing,” Durkin pointed out the importance of U.S. policies aimed at helping manufacturers “retain competitiveness in advanced manufacturing” and “leapfrog” in sectors where it needs to maintain preeminence.
  • At the same time, she stressed the need to reduce overreliance on single markets and supply chain “choke points,” arguing that manufacturers’ global footprint and diversification with U.S. allies are a “source of resilience.”

The bottom line: Durkin urged policymakers to work closely with manufacturers as they consider changes to the agreement—particularly aground rules of origin, where adjustments can ripple across supply chains and affect costs and competitiveness across the sector.

  • “Our advice to the government is: Please work with us,” she said. “We will be happy to test-proof some innovative ideas around rules of origin.”
  • Durkin said manufacturers can help policymakers determine which parts of the production process are most important to retain in the United States—and where the region can benefit from integrated North American supply chains, including access to raw materials that are not available domestically.

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AI boom lifts Mexico tech exports, complicating Trump trade goals


WASHINGTON – The United States’ frenzied rush to build out AI infrastructure has boosted exports of Mexican technology, complicating President Donald Trump’s hand heading into trade negotiations.

Trump, who campaigned on boosting US manufacturing, hopes to narrow the trade deficit with Mexico during talks to update the USMCA free trade agreement, which kick off Tuesday in Mexico City.

But the dizzying rise in computer equipment exports from Mexico — the largest US trading partner — is doing the opposite.

Between January and April, Mexico tripled its sales of computer equipment to the United States compared to the same period last year, with exports topping $50 billion versus just $2.2 billion in imports, according to AFP calculations.

The sector now makes up 30 percent of all Mexican products shipped to the United States, overtaking the automotive industry as the largest component of exports.

“It’s a milestone largely driven by demand for advanced AI electronics,” Diego Flores, head of electronic and digital industries at Mexico’s Economy Ministry, told AFP.

The sector, which includes processing units and data centre hardware, is not officially on the agenda for this round of negotiations.

– Explosive demand –

The most in-demand products are server racks that house AI processing cards — a key component for the data centres multiplying across the United States.

The main export hub is the Pacific state of Jalisco, dubbed the “Mexican Silicon Valley,” where an ecosystem of global industry giants and tech startups have set up shop, Flores said.

Taiwanese giant Foxconn assembles server racks in Jalisco, and serves as a strategic partner to US chip designer Nvidia.

In March, Foxconn announced $137 million in investments across two Mexican subsidiaries after estimating its production could double this year.

“The United States and Mexico will remain our primary production hubs,” Chief Executive Michael Chiang said, announcing the company would invest 30 percent more than in 2025 to expand its AI-related capacity.

Faced with booming demand, Flextronics, another tech manufacturer in Jalisco, even had to repurpose its parking lots to expand manufacturing capacity, Flores said. 

Yet the boom comes amid a volatile political climate.

The Trump administration rejected a 16-year extension of the USMCA, opting instead for annual reviews with Mexico and Canada.

Washington is also continuing to push for more goods to be manufactured domestically, even as US reliance on imports from Mexico, Taiwan, and China to fuel its AI boom grows.

– ‘In the line of fire’ –

Could the thriving sector become Trump’s next tariff target?

“Nobody can say for sure,” Flores admitted. However, he expressed confidence that the sector might escape protectionist policies due to its immense strategic value to the United States.

Washington is also seeking to limit the use of Asian technology within North America, according to William Jackson, a chief emerging markets economist at Capital Economics.

“The Trump administration has to weigh the demand for these technologies and the need to stay at the forefront of AI development,” he told AFP, noting that “tariffs could prove counterproductive to that goal.”

But balancing the preservation of a booming industry with protectionist rhetoric puts the sector “very easily in the line of fire,” he warned.

That risk is heightened by the fact that Mexican manufacturers use components sourced from China and Taiwan, which Trump could view as a “backdoor” or Trojan horse for Asian technology entering the United States.

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Manufacturers eyeing U.S. move as trade tensions take a toll: KPMG


BNN Bloomberg is Canada’s definitive source for business news dedicated exclusively to helping Canadians invest and build their businesses.

A new survey shows trade tensions have some Canadian manufacturers deciding to move production south of the border or delay capital investments.

KPMG Canada said on Tuesday that 42 per cent of Canadian manufacturing companies indicated they have or are considering moving production to the United States. Of those considering relocating, 77 per cent expect to make the transition within the next two years.

Anamika Gadia, partner and national leader of industrial markets at KPMG Canada, said domestic manufacturers have shown resilience over the last year, “but resilience certainly has its limits.”

“Our survey clearly shows that while companies have been making short-term decisions to adapt to tariffs and trade uncertainty, they’re now moving toward making longer-term investment decisions,” she said in an interview.

“In other words, they’re not waiting to see what might happen with the trade situation, including the CUSMA discussions and they’re moving to make longer-term investment decisions, including investment decisions that see them shifting their production to the U.S.”

Results for the survey were taken from business owners, executives and decision-makers at 275 Canadian manufacturing companies between May 11 and May 29, using Angus Reid’s business research panel.

Last week, United States Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said the U.S. is not renewing the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement “in its current form” — but the trade agreement will remain in place as negotiations continue.

The decision triggers a rolling annual review for up to a decade, at which point it will expire if an extension isn’t agreed upon. CUSMA remains in place unless one of the partner countries gives six months’ notice that it is pulling out.

The trade agreement has shielded Canada from many of U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs, but the country is being affected by separate sectoral tariffs on industries like steel, aluminum, automobiles and cabinetry.

Gadia said the issues go beyond the trade situation though, with Canada needing to create a competitive environment for manufacturers to grow.

“This survey clearly shows that manufacturers need to feel more comfortable and see some action from the government in order to continue to produce and invest and grow in Canada,” she said.

“Some of the key factors that companies have cited are more certainty around interprovincial trade barriers, they need more tariff certainty, they want to see lower corporate taxes, they want better access to capital and cheaper energy.”

The survey also found 57 per cent of manufacturing firms have paused, reduced or cancelled capital investment projects. Thirty-six per cent said they have scaled back investments, 12 per cent have paused their plans and nine per cent have cancelled planned spending.

Gadia said delays in capital investments may be a signal that those investment dollars are going to be redeployed into the U.S.

The survey showed 80 per cent of manufacturers were planning to maintain their Canadian headquarters, but 11 per cent were planning to move their head office to the U.S. within the next five years.

A loss of that size could meaningfully impact Canada’s gross domestic product, KPMG Canada said.

According to figures from the federal government, the manufacturing sector represents about 10 per cent of Canada’s overall GDP.

This report by The Canadian Press was first published July 7, 2026.

Daniel Johnson, The Canadian Press

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3 US Manufacturing Stocks Tied To Onshoring And Trade Tariff Shifts


Trade tensions across North America are rising as the United States moves away from the current USMCA framework and threatens new tariffs on key sectors. For investors, that kind of policy uncertainty can reshape where companies choose to produce, source materials, and invest. Some US manufacturing stocks could see fresh interest if companies look to bring more activity onshore, while others may face higher costs or supply chain disruption. This article explains how that backdrop relates to US domestic manufacturing and onshoring trends, and discusses 3 stocks that appear positively exposed to the latest trade headlines.

Steel Dynamics (STLD)

Overview: Steel Dynamics is a large US steel producer and metal recycler that makes a wide range of flat rolled, structural and engineered steel products, building components and recycled aluminum, serving construction, automotive, manufacturing, energy and infrastructure customers.

Operations: Steel Dynamics generates most of its roughly US$20.9b in segment revenues from Steel Operations at about US$13.9b, followed by Metals Recycling at about US$4.4b, with Steel Fabrication, Aluminum and Other segments contributing smaller amounts, and virtually all revenue coming from the United States.

Market Cap: US$33.1b

Steel Dynamics provides direct exposure to US onshoring and infrastructure spending, with most revenue coming from domestic steel operations and a growing aluminum and recycling platform that relies less on cross border supply chains at a time when USMCA uncertainty and tariff threats are increasing. The company has high quality earnings, rising margins and analyst expectations for solid revenue and earnings growth, yet the stock trades below one estimate of fair value based on future cash flows. At the same time, investors need to weigh risks such as capital intensive growth projects, exposure to cyclical construction and auto demand, and recent insider selling. The key consideration is how these trade, growth and balance sheet factors may interact for Steel Dynamics over the next few years.

Steel Dynamics’ high quality earnings and US focused operations could be only half the story. The real question is what the market may be missing about its growth runway and risks in the analyst forecasts for Steel Dynamics

STLD Discounted Cash Flow as at Jul 2026STLD Discounted Cash Flow as at Jul 2026

Warrior Met Coal (HCC)

Overview: Warrior Met Coal is a US producer of metallurgical coal used in steelmaking, supplying hard coking coal from underground mines in Alabama to steel manufacturers across Europe, South America and Asia, with additional revenue from natural gas produced as a byproduct.

Operations: Warrior Met Coal generates about US$1.43b of its roughly US$1.47b in revenue from Mining, with the small remainder from other activities.

Market Cap: US$4.27b

Warrior Met Coal operates at the intersection of US onshoring trends and global steel demand, providing metallurgical coal that supports domestic and allied steel production at a time when trade rules are in flux. The planned Blue Creek ramp up, tax credits tied to metallurgical coal being treated as a critical mineral, and a focus on premium low volatility coal contribute to a cost and quality profile that analysts associate with positive earnings expectations and a constructive revenue outlook. At the same time, heavy exposure to export markets, industry-wide decarbonization pressure and the need to place higher future volumes present ongoing risks for investors. The key consideration is how these factors balance out for long term shareholders.

Warrior Met Coal’s growth story hinges on premium met coal, tax credits and the Blue Creek ramp up, yet the real tension is how future volumes and export exposure shape the analyst forecasts for Warrior Met Coal

NYSE:HCC Earnings & Revenue Growth as at Jul 2026NYSE:HCC Earnings & Revenue Growth as at Jul 2026

MasTec (MTZ)

Overview: MasTec is an infrastructure construction company that designs, builds, installs, and maintains critical communications, energy, utility, and industrial assets, from fiber and 5G networks to renewable power, pipelines, and grid infrastructure across the United States and Canada.

Operations: MasTec generates most of its revenue from Clean Energy and Infrastructure at about US$5.1b and Power Delivery at about US$4.3b, followed by Communications at about US$3.5b and Pipeline Infrastructure at about US$2.5b, with a small eliminations adjustment.

Market Cap: US$33.5b

MasTec operates at the intersection of US onshoring activity and real-world infrastructure buildouts, with a record backlog in power delivery, clean energy, and communications that ties directly to grid upgrades, data centers, and factory projects. The stock trades at a relatively high P/E and the company relies on significant debt, so execution on large projects and policy support around energy and infrastructure are important considerations. Management notes that long-term agreements, diversified projects, and detailed tariff planning are intended to help offset these risks, but understanding how the backlog, margin potential, and balance sheet risk interact requires looking beyond headline growth figures.

MasTec’s accelerating backlog story may be masking the real trade off between growth and balance sheet risk, so it is worth reading the analyst forecasts for MasTec to see what the market might be missing.

NYSE:MTZ Earnings & Revenue Growth as at Jul 2026NYSE:MTZ Earnings & Revenue Growth as at Jul 2026

The three stocks covered here are just a starting point. The full US Domestic Manufacturing and Onshoring screen surfaces 25 more companies that pair onshore operations with catalysts around trade policy, supply chains and capital investment in ways that may not be obvious at first glance via the US Domestic Manufacturing and Onshoring screener. Use Simply Wall St to identify, analyze and filter for the specific earnings, balance sheet and policy driven narratives that matter most to you so you can focus on the highest conviction ideas within this theme.

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By uncovering hidden catalysts and risks early, you’ll accelerate your decision-making and stay one step ahead of the market.

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This article by Simply Wall St is general in nature. We provide commentary based on historical data
and analyst forecasts only using an unbiased methodology and our articles are not intended to be financial advice.
It does not constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any stock, and does not take account of your objectives, or your
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Note that our analysis may not factor in the latest price-sensitive company announcements or qualitative material.
Simply Wall St has no position in any stocks mentioned.

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PODCAST | Could Trade Deal Uncertainty Slow America’s Manufacturing Comeback?


As manufacturers weigh new investments in U.S. capacity, automation and reshoring, trade certainty is becoming a central factor in where companies source components and place final assembly.

The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA, is heading toward its first formal review on July 1. The outcome could affect supply chains, production planning and long-term investment decisions across North America.

Industry insiders fear that the Trump administration’s concerns that Canada and Mexico are not treating the United States fairly in certain areas could complicate the renewal process.

“We’ve got to stay in this relationship and work on it, not be threatening it with a divorce,” says Patrick Lozada, Senior Director of Global Policy at the National Electrical Manufacturers Association.

While acknowledging there are legitimate issues that need to be addressed during the upcoming USMCA review, he argues that manufacturers still need the long-term certainty and integrated North American supply chains that the agreement provides. 

The agreement lays down rules for how components qualify to move across borders duty-free. Lozada says that structure has helped manufacturers deepen investments across North America.

NEMA is urging the three governments to renew the agreement for another 16 years, while still using existing mechanisms to resolve disputes and update portions of the agreement.





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“A long-term renewal would not mean a static agreement,” Lozada says. “But what it would do is provide a sense of direction and certainty for manufacturers.”

That certainty is especially important for electrical manufacturers because the sector relies on a deeply integrated North American value chain.

“USMCA has allowed us to link design, engineering, manufacturing, assembly, testing, certification and services between all three countries,” Lozada says.

He says that integration has also helped the industry reduce reliance on China.

“Since 2018, China’s market share of electrical industry imports to the United States has decreased by 49%,” Lozada says.

Electrical manufacturing is also becoming increasingly important as AI, data centers, automation and advanced manufacturing expand.

“Electrical components comprise approximately one-third of the total spend to build a typical AI data center,” Lozada says. They also represent about 10% of the total spend for a new U.S. manufacturing facility.

NEMA projects U.S. electricity demand will increase by 55% by 2050, with data centers as a major driver. Lozada says AI data centers alone are expected to increase their share of energy demand by 300% over the next 10 years.

“We’ve got to have a grid that keeps pace with the incredible change in demand,” Lozada says.

Trade uncertainty, however, can complicate those investments. Lozada says changing tariff levels are especially difficult for manufacturers planning long-term production.

“If one day you’re paying 0% under a trade agreement, and then the next day you’re facing a 25% tax, and then the next day you’re facing a 10% tax, that is kryptonite for long-term certainty for manufacturers,” he says.

Lozada says NEMA also sees the USMCA review as an opportunity to resolve standards and regulatory issues, especially in Mexico. He says Mexico has not updated its electrical code since 2012, leaving it three editions behind the U.S. and Canada.

“Nobody supports an old electrical code,” Lozada says. “Nobody should support having standards that are out of date.”

If USMCA remains in limbo after the review, Lozada expects manufacturers and investors may interpret continued negotiations as manageable in the near term, but insufficient for long-term planning.

Certainty, Lozada says, is necessary for manufacturers considering new production capacity, new lines or new facilities.

“Manufacturers want to see certainty around what they’re going to pay,” Lozada says. “What they’re going to pay in terms of tariffs and taxes on their inputs, and then what markets they’re going to be able to access.”

NEMA is also advocating for a tariff incentive framework that would provide tariff relief or rebates for companies investing in U.S. manufacturing.

“If you’re investing in America, you’re bringing manufacturing back home, let’s get a discount off of those tariffs,” Lozada says.

According to Lozada, the framework could help advance U.S. manufacturing investment while managing costs for manufacturers and consumers.

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U.S. Charges 4 Of The World’s Largest Shipping Container Manufacturers Over Multi-Billion-Dollar Trade Conspiracy


shippingImage for representation purposes only

The United States has charged seven Chinese executives and four of the world’s biggest shipping container manufacturers with allegedly fixing prices and restricting the global supply of shipping containers during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) said the companies controlled about 95% of the world’s standard dry shipping container production and worked together between November 2019 and January 2024 to limit output and raise prices.

Prosecutors said the alleged conspiracy increased the cost of shipping containers during the global supply chain crisis, forcing businesses and consumers to pay more for goods shipped worldwide.

The companies named in the indictment are Hong Kong-listed Singamas Container Holdings Ltd., Chinese container manufacturing giant China International Marine Containers (Group) Co., Ltd. (CIMC), Shanghai Universal Logistics Equipment Co., Ltd., also known as Dong Fang International Containers, and CXIC Group Containers Co. Ltd..

The DOJ said executives from the companies met in Shenzhen in November 2019 and agreed to reduce production in order to increase container prices.

According to prosecutors, the companies limited production shifts and factory operating hours, agreed not to build new factories, and created a penalty system for companies that broke the agreement.

Investigators also alleged the companies installed 87 surveillance cameras across 49 production lines to make sure manufacturers followed the agreed production limits.

By September 2020, prosecutors said the alleged cartel expanded the arrangement to limit the number of containers supplied to specific customers, including major U.S.-based shipping lines, logistics companies and container leasing firms.

The DOJ said the conspiracy later evolved into production caps that remained in place until at least late 2023.

Prosecutors cited internal presentations allegedly showing “allowable quota” limits assigned to participating manufacturers and factories.

One executive, Vick Nam Hing Ma, a marketing director at Singamas, was arrested in France in April 2026 and is awaiting extradition to the United States. Six other executives remain at large.

Other executives charged include Siong Seng Teo, Boliang Mai, Tianhua Huang, Yongbo Wan, Qianmin Li and Yuqiang Zhang.

U.S. officials said the alleged cartel operated during one of the worst global shipping disruptions in recent history, when container shortages and port congestion disrupted trade routes and increased freight costs worldwide.

According to the indictment, CIMC’s container manufacturing profits rose from about $19.8 million in 2019 to around $1.75 billion in 2021.

Singamas also moved from a loss of about $110 million in 2019 to profits of around $186.8 million in 2021.

Associate Attorney General Stanley Woodward accused the companies of manipulating markets during the pandemic, while Acting Assistant Attorney General Omeed A. Assefi said the companies “held hostage the world’s supply of ocean shipping containers” during the global supply chain crisis.

The companies and executives were charged under the Sherman Antitrust Act, which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison for individuals and fines of up to $100 million for companies.

Reference: US Department of Justice

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The information on this website is for general purposes only. While efforts are made to ensure accuracy, we make no warranties of any kind regarding completeness, reliability, or suitability. Any reliance you place on such information is at your own risk. We are not liable for any loss or damage arising from the use of this website.

Disclaimer :
The information on this website is for general purposes only. While efforts are made to ensure accuracy, we make no warranties of any kind regarding completeness, reliability, or suitability. Any reliance you place on such information is at your own risk. We are not liable for any loss or damage arising from the use of this website.

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Billionaire behind ‘American Factory’ firm warns of US exit amid trade friction with China


As one of the world’s largest automotive glass producers, and the subject of an Oscar-winning documentary, Fuyao Glass is a familiar name in the United States. Now, its founder has warned he is prepared to shut down his American plants if trade friction and tariffs cause severe losses.

Responding to questions regarding geopolitical risks at the company’s annual general meeting, Cao Dewang said that the company would not engage in loss-making ventures.

“How much in duties you want to impose is your business,” said the billionaire, who turns 80 next month. “If we encounter unreasonable situations, we’ll simply shut down the [US] factories.”

While Fuyao’s American roots stretch back to 1995, its presence is now anchored by its plant in Moraine, Ohio – a shuttered General Motors factory that Fuyao purchased in 2014.

The 2019 film American Factory documented the site’s transformation, tracing both its role in revitalising a depressed local economy and Cao’s harsh campaign against unionisation.

Today, Fuyao Glass employs thousands of American workers across facilities in Ohio, Illinois and South Carolina, supplying leading automotive manufacturers including General Motors, Ford and BMW in the United States, according to its website.

The company also holds the distinction of being the first Chinese firm to successfully sue the US Department of Commerce, winning a landmark case that virtually exempted Fuyao from anti-dumping duties in 2004.

09:42

Trump promises to bring US manufacturing back from China, but will his tariffs work?

Trump promises to bring US manufacturing back from China, but will his tariffs work?

Cao’s comments earlier this week – widely reported by Chinese media, including state-owned The Paper – came just over a year after US President Donald Trump launched his “Liberation Day” tariffs on major trading partners. The move ignited a renewed trade war with Beijing that saw duties on Chinese imports peak at 145 per cent before tensions de-escalated.

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The art of reshoring: A better trade balance



reshoringReshoring decisions respond better to cost competitiveness and predictability than to trade barriers and uncertainty.

The driving force of offshoring has been and is that United States manufacturing costs are 10%–50% higher than in almost all competitor countries.

Competing industrial economies like China undervalue their currencies, making their exports less expensive globally, while our overvalued dollar makes U.S. products more expensive and less competitive. As a result, we import many more goods than we export, leading to the large trade deficits of the last several decades ($1.26 trillion goods deficit for 2025). To address this, a targeted revaluation of the U.S. dollar (e.g., by 20%) would improve cost competitiveness and drive both reshoring and more exports. Let’s dig in:

Tariffs and currency strength

Weak demand and tariff impacts are weighing heavily on companies, with recent U.S. military actions increasing uncertainty and complexity. Tariffs provoke retaliation from trading partners, further reducing exports and introduce policy uncertainty that discourages long-term U.S. investment. Consequently, investors move capital into assets perceived as “safe havens,” like the U.S. dollar. This flight to safety strengthens the U.S. dollar, making U.S. goods and services even less competitive.

U.S. jobs steady or surging

U.S. 2025 reshoring job announcements are holding steady but could climb substantially if tariff policies become more measured, stable and long term. As global supply chains grapple with tariff uncertainty, there are many announcements of projects that are “in the works,” and other “solid” announcements from recent years that may be canceled. Ongoing tariff uncertainty and mixed messaging have slowed many reshoring and foreign direct investment (FDI) announcements and delayed action.

A 2025 Reshoring Initiative Report Preview projected that approximately 240,000 reshoring jobs were announced in 2025, down by about 7% from 2024. This is still a solid outcome given the policy uncertainty, the inevitable lag between policy changes and project announcements.

More announcements on deck

Many more reshoring and FDI announcements are on deck as companies await clarity on tariff policy. Current Reshoring Initiative data does not include many of the reshoring and FDI projects cited by President Trump as $21 trillion and restated by Bloomberg as $7 trillion. These projects largely reflect companies in a “pending” posture—developing plans for U.S. reshoring or FDI that they intend to activate if/when tariff structures become firm and predictable.

Tariff complexity

U.S. manufacturing activity slipped to a 14-month low in December with falling new orders and high-input costs continuing a trend of uncertainty and weakness. Yale Budget Lab estimated the administration’s trade policy has raised the average tariff on imports to 17% up from 3% YOY.

Manufacturers are reducing orders for inputs and raw materials due to the uncertainty. Many manufacturers have indicated that the constantly shifting tariffs are making it impossible to strategize and proceed with large investment decisions. Companies need stability for multi-year planning for building new facilities and establishing supply chains.

A better proposal

The strong U.S. dollar poses significant challenges to domestic manufacturing and reshoring efforts. The USD is overvalued 20% vs. developed countries and 100% vs. China and other EM countries. Reshoring decisions respond better to cost competitiveness and predictability than to trade barriers and uncertainty. An approach that avoids an excessively strong USD will support domestic reshoring and supply chain resilience better than a tariff-based approach.

A firm, long-term tariff is much better than no action at all to address our cost competitiveness problem. However, a 20% lower USD, reversing some or all of the USD’s overvaluation against developed countries plus a 25% tariff on China, is preferred, since it reduces imports and increases exports. Tariff uncertainty does the opposite.

I offer a better proposition: A lower USD as opposed to tariffs to improve U.S. manufacturing competitiveness and incentivize reshoring. A policy that encourages a lower U.S. dollar offers, vs. tariffs, a more effective, efficient and sustainable strategy to reshoring.

MAC and a competitive U.S. dollar

Dr. John Hansen, a former economic adviser at the World Bank, developed the MAC financial mechanism to restore a competitive dollar. A more competitively valued dollar will restore global competitiveness to American factories, reduce our growing dependence on imported goods, generate billions of dollars and accelerate economic growth by eliminating the negative effects of the current trade deficit that reduces our GDP growth rate.

The Market Access Charge

The Market Access Charge, or MAC, is a small variable tax on all foreign capital inflows into U.S. financial markets. It is a financial mechanism designed to address the U.S. trade deficit and currency valuation issues.

This tax, perhaps 1% 1x on each transaction, is designed to correct trade imbalances and accomplish four key goals: increase exports; reduce imports; encourage FDI in U.S. factories instead of in U.S. financial assets; and generate revenue for infrastructure and workforce training. The Reshoring Initiative supports MAC as a solution.

The U.S. 250th anniversary

The U.S. will celebrate its 250th anniversary in 2026. As we contemplate the Declaration of Independence, we are reminded of the nation’s foundational ideals rooted in freedom, self-reliance, equality and human potential. Those ideals are essential to a healthy domestic manufacturing industry and manufacturing is essential to our American identity and economic and national security. We believe a more competitive dollar, targeted industrial policies and skilled workforce development is a comprehensive solution to support and expand America’s domestic manufacturing industry.

Harry Moser is founder and president of Reshoring Initiative.

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U.S. Launches Major Trade Investigation into Global Manufacturing Overcapacity | 2026 – News and Statistics


Mar 12, 2026

According to SupplyChainDive, the United States has initiated an investigation into the manufacturing policies of multiple nations to evaluate potential structural excess capacity and its effects on domestic industries. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative is conducting this Section 301 probe, which includes China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India.

The investigation will assess possible supply and demand imbalances, policies affecting wages, and barriers to market access. The USTR filing indicates that key trading partners have developed manufacturing capacity that exceeds both domestic and global demand incentives, leading to overproduction, persistent trade surpluses, and underutilized facilities.

Sectors identified as currently experiencing overcapacity and excessive production include automobiles, electronics, processed food, and semiconductors. The filing specifically cited electric vehicle production in China as surpassing demand, noting one manufacturer’s expanding distribution and production networks abroad. USTR Jamieson Greer stated that overproduction by trading partners displaces existing U.S. domestic production or prevents new U.S. manufacturing investment and expansion.

The agency will open a docket for public comments on March 17, with a hearing scheduled for May 5. This investigation adds to a series of Section 301 probes started in the last year. Following a Supreme Court ruling in February that eliminated a broad set of tariffs installed last year, Greer said the U.S. would launch these investigations on an accelerated schedule, with an expectation they could be completed within the next five months.

Trade analysts note that if the investigation concludes that foreign industrial policies are unreasonable or distort trade, the U.S. could respond with tariffs. The current administration has previously used Section 301 investigations to review trading practices of other nations, some of which resulted in levies.

  1. 1. INTRODUCTION

    Making Data-Driven Decisions to Grow Your Business

    1. REPORT DESCRIPTION
    2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THE AI PLATFORM
    3. DATA-DRIVEN DECISIONS FOR YOUR BUSINESS
    4. GLOSSARY AND SPECIFIC TERMS
  2. 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    A Quick Overview of Market Performance

    1. KEY FINDINGS
    2. MARKET TRENDS This Chapter is Available Only for the Professional EditionPRO
  3. 3. MARKET OVERVIEW

    Understanding the Current State of The Market and its Prospects

    1. MARKET SIZE: HISTORICAL DATA (2012–2025) AND FORECAST (2026–2035)
    2. CONSUMPTION BY COUNTRY: HISTORICAL DATA (2012–2025) AND FORECAST (2026–2035)
    3. MARKET FORECAST TO 2035
  4. 4. MOST PROMISING PRODUCTS FOR DIVERSIFICATION

    Finding New Products to Diversify Your Business

    1. TOP PRODUCTS TO DIVERSIFY YOUR BUSINESS
    2. BEST-SELLING PRODUCTS
    3. MOST CONSUMED PRODUCTS
    4. MOST TRADED PRODUCTS
    5. MOST PROFITABLE PRODUCTS FOR EXPORT
  5. 5. MOST PROMISING SUPPLYING COUNTRIES

    Choosing the Best Countries to Establish Your Sustainable Supply Chain

    1. TOP COUNTRIES TO SOURCE YOUR PRODUCT
    2. TOP PRODUCING COUNTRIES
    3. TOP EXPORTING COUNTRIES
    4. LOW-COST EXPORTING COUNTRIES
  6. 6. MOST PROMISING OVERSEAS MARKETS

    Choosing the Best Countries to Boost Your Export

    1. TOP OVERSEAS MARKETS FOR EXPORTING YOUR PRODUCT
    2. TOP CONSUMING MARKETS
    3. UNSATURATED MARKETS
    4. TOP IMPORTING MARKETS
    5. MOST PROFITABLE MARKETS
  7. 7. PRODUCTION

    The Latest Trends and Insights into The Industry

    1. PRODUCTION VOLUME AND VALUE: HISTORICAL DATA (2012–2025) AND FORECAST (2026–2035)
    2. PRODUCTION BY COUNTRY: HISTORICAL DATA (2012–2025) AND FORECAST (2026–2035)
  8. 8. IMPORTS

    The Largest Import Supplying Countries

    1. IMPORTS: HISTORICAL DATA (2012–2025) AND FORECAST (2026–2035)
    2. IMPORTS BY COUNTRY: HISTORICAL DATA (2012–2025) AND FORECAST (2026–2035)
    3. IMPORT PRICES BY COUNTRY: HISTORICAL DATA (2012–2025) AND FORECAST (2026–2035)
  9. 9. EXPORTS

    The Largest Destinations for Exports

    1. EXPORTS: HISTORICAL DATA (2012–2025) AND FORECAST (2026–2035)
    2. EXPORTS BY COUNTRY: HISTORICAL DATA (2012–2025) AND FORECAST (2026–2035)
    3. EXPORT PRICES BY COUNTRY: HISTORICAL DATA (2012–2025) AND FORECAST (2026–2035)
  10. 10. PROFILES OF MAJOR PRODUCERS

    The Largest Producers on The Market and Their Profiles

  11. 11. COUNTRY PROFILES

    The Largest Markets And Their Profiles

    This Chapter is Available Only for the Professional Edition
    PRO

    1. 11.1

      United States

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    2. 11.2

      China

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    3. 11.3

      Japan

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    4. 11.4

      Germany

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    5. 11.5

      United Kingdom

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    6. 11.6

      France

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    7. 11.7

      Brazil

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    8. 11.8

      Italy

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    9. 11.9

      Russian Federation

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    10. 11.10

      India

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    11. 11.11

      Canada

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    12. 11.12

      Australia

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    13. 11.13

      Republic of Korea

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    14. 11.14

      Spain

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    15. 11.15

      Mexico

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    16. 11.16

      Indonesia

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    17. 11.17

      Netherlands

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    18. 11.18

      Turkey

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    19. 11.19

      Saudi Arabia

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    20. 11.20

      Switzerland

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    21. 11.21

      Sweden

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    22. 11.22

      Nigeria

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    23. 11.23

      Poland

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    24. 11.24

      Belgium

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    25. 11.25

      Argentina

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    26. 11.26

      Norway

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    27. 11.27

      Austria

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    28. 11.28

      Thailand

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    29. 11.29

      United Arab Emirates

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    30. 11.30

      Colombia

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    31. 11.31

      Denmark

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    32. 11.32

      South Africa

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    33. 11.33

      Malaysia

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    34. 11.34

      Israel

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    35. 11.35

      Singapore

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    36. 11.36

      Egypt

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    37. 11.37

      Philippines

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    38. 11.38

      Finland

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    39. 11.39

      Chile

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    40. 11.40

      Ireland

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    41. 11.41

      Pakistan

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    42. 11.42

      Greece

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    43. 11.43

      Portugal

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    44. 11.44

      Kazakhstan

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    45. 11.45

      Algeria

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    46. 11.46

      Czech Republic

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    47. 11.47

      Qatar

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    48. 11.48

      Peru

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    49. 11.49

      Romania

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
    50. 11.50

      Vietnam

      • Market Size
      • Production
      • Imports
      • Exports
  12. LIST OF TABLES

    1. Key Findings In 2025
    2. Market Volume, In Physical Terms: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    3. Market Value: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    4. Per Capita Consumption, by Country, 2022–2025
    5. Production, In Physical Terms, By Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    6. Imports, In Physical Terms, By Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    7. Imports, In Value Terms, By Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    8. Import Prices, By Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    9. Exports, In Physical Terms, By Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    10. Exports, In Value Terms, By Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    11. Export Prices, By Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
  13. LIST OF FIGURES

    1. Market Volume, In Physical Terms: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    2. Market Value: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    3. Consumption, by Country, 2025
    4. Market Volume Forecast to 2035
    5. Market Value Forecast to 2035
    6. Market Size and Growth, By Product
    7. Average Per Capita Consumption, By Product
    8. Exports and Growth, By Product
    9. Export Prices and Growth, By Product
    10. Production Volume and Growth
    11. Exports and Growth
    12. Export Prices and Growth
    13. Market Size and Growth
    14. Per Capita Consumption
    15. Imports and Growth
    16. Import Prices
    17. Production, In Physical Terms: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    18. Production, In Value Terms: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    19. Production, by Country, 2025
    20. Production, In Physical Terms, by Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    21. Imports, In Physical Terms: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    22. Imports, In Value Terms: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    23. Imports, In Physical Terms, By Country, 2025
    24. Imports, In Physical Terms, By Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    25. Imports, In Value Terms, By Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    26. Import Prices, By Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    27. Exports, In Physical Terms: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    28. Exports, In Value Terms: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    29. Exports, In Physical Terms, By Country, 2025
    30. Exports, In Physical Terms, By Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    31. Exports, In Value Terms, By Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)
    32. Export Prices, By Country: Historical Data (2012–2025) and Forecast (2026–2035)

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